How the System and Martin Ødegaard Have Helped Solve One Another
A review of Ødegaard's 2021/22 campaign and how the system helped accentuate his traits
Intro
When Martin Ødegaard signed on loan last season, I wrote a lengthy piece detailing everything I could about his spells at both Real Sociedad and Real Madrid. I concluded that he was a great acquisition to have compete with Emile Smith-Rowe for the #10 spot due to his creative upside.
Since then, the Norwegian has signed on a permanent basis (for £36million), has been assigned the #8 shirt, has been given the Captain’s armband on multiple occasions, and is very much symbiotic of everything Arteta has been working towards.
Whilst I had, and still have, doubts over the persisting weaknesses of his overall game, it’s quite extraordinary how the system has so specifically managed to camouflage his flaws and weaponise his strengths.
As a result, the system and the player have sort of become co-dependent. If the system isn’t functioning at its highest capacity, Ødegaard’s performances drop with it; if Ødegaard isn’t matching the level of the system – which is rare, as it provides such a confidence-boosting backboard – then the system’s creative spark fizzles out.
In this piece, I will retrace trodden ground to further demonstrate how the system is able to have such a positive impact on his game (with some visuals this time).
Attacking
Movement and positioning
Although Ødegaard’s role as a #10 or a right-sided #8 has persisted throughout his spells in North London and Spain, the parameters of them have varied quite substantially.
At Real Madrid, he was a floating playmaker, drifting in and out of pockets, aiming to connect the dots without restrictions. At Real Sociedad, he was much more tied down to Imanol Alguacil’s more rigid but still possession-based 4-3-3. Now at Arsenal, he is subject to a different kind of beast, albeit still within a 4-3-3 framework. It’s arguably a much more intricate and measured system, based around creating and capitalising on superiorities at every turn, which I laid out at a more macro level in my analysis of our home win over Brentford.
In Spain, his lacking awareness of the pitch and tendencies to want to drop short to the ball meant that he struggled in a Luka Modrić and Toni Kroos-led Real Madrid side. Things were better for him in the Basque Country, as his quite basic functions within Alguacil’s 4-3-3 were accounted for by his teammates within the wide triangle (the winger, fullback and himself as the interior).
A lot more is asked of him in the current setup movement-wise, but Ødegaard has consistently stood up to the test. And, even when he hasn’t, the system’s focus on individual scenarios has ensured that the mistiming or misdirection of his actions hasn’t stopped a sequence in its tracks. This contrasts the impact a mistimed run can have during a typical 3-man rotation that occurs within more basic 4-3-3 mechanisms.
Away from what he does to receive the ball, he also has work to do to ensure his teammates can thrive. This includes pulling his midfield marker deep by pushing slowly up the pitch, which affords the likes of Ben White more space to carry the ball into in front.
He also attempts the reverse of this to pin Saka on the other end. This can be through subtle movements short from high up that draw the attention of the opposition’s fullback. Other times, they can be more overt movements, like briefly running through the halfspace to drag the opponent away, or dropping right in front of the midfield line to ensure Saka is more isolated higher up.
The lack of a wholehearted push through the channel itself was something I was critical of early last season, but it backs the fact that it is more about isolating teammates against opponents to take advantage of the 1v1 superiorities. It also means that Ødegaard can then be in a healthy, goal-sided position to support Saka, offensively or defensively.
Although this can result in more time being needed to successfully reach the opposition’s goal, it adds security which provides greater dominance, thus affording more chances to string moves together in ways that can be as complex as they are insured against counter threats.
When moving to receive directly to feet between the lines, these can come through extensions of the above. For instance, pushing higher before darting inwards off the blind-side, so to receive in the space held open by the attackers ahead.
These were a strength of his at Real Sociedad, and the injection of pace in his efforts for Arsenal have allowed him to exploit pockets of space more freely.
This is also seen in deep, stretched buildup phases and following turnovers. With his opposite number often pressing up, he can use them to find holes in their cover shadow. Whereas, on counters, he has the same luxury of being tasked with finding the right gap to receive through whilst being able to remain ball-facing.
Equally, in already higher parts of the pitch, he prioritises his position to create the best possible split with a teammate in order to make the ball-holder’s next move that bit easier, as seen in some of the examples above.
Out further wide, Ødegaard’s underlaps for Saka are specifically engineered to facilitate incremental progress. Rather than making completely vertical runs through the inside channel, he will instead drop close into the opposition fullback’s cover shadow and receive short ahead. Whilst this could be perceived as negative, as he’s receiving facing the touchline, it frees him of his initial marker (centre-back) and allows his next move to be goal-facing without much pressure.
This isn’t always used to receive directly, either, as the dismarking it creates sees passages where play is recycled short to the middle and straight back, meaning Ødegaard is now suddenly free on the cut-in.
What’s been a positive from Ødegaard in this respect is his general understanding for when to drop and when to push, relative to the compactness of the block. This also has an influence on whether he chooses to engage wide opponents alongside Saka or be more patient by recycling back into the middle.
The staple of the #8’s movement in this system, as hinted at already, is the simple move wide to the touchline in-between the right-back and Saka. It has struck the perfect balance of putting Ødegaard in a free and deep position to receive, which suits his game to the ground, as his positional tendencies in Spain showcased.
Although it’s rare that the trio on the right do file into exactly the same line, it’s rare that this sort of setup leads to congestion. The support offered from the central figures, like Partey, Lacazette and White, as well as the slightly angled positions of those either side, always work intensely to help centre the ball-player perfectly.
This puts Ødegaard into situations where he often has all the time and space necessary to help recycle at a steady pace, to handle rare pressure using the plethora of options exampled below, or kick progressions into gear.
Receiving the ball
A long-standing problem for Ødegaard has been that he often looks to receive ball-facing or with his back to goal. This tends to result in him stepping back onto the ball into the space from which he received, which can occasionally be into very congested areas that he can’t then escape from. This can ruin the value of the position he’s received in and can also reduce what he’s able to achieve with his first touches as it means his body angles are shut off to the other options.
This has a hugely negative affect on his awareness of teammates and space, which resulted in common instances where he wouldn’t be able to lay the ball off quickly, or would perhaps even congest a space that is already being occupied by a teammate. The latter having been much more of an issue for the Galacticós due to their more fluid shape under Zinédine Zidane.
That being said, at his best for La Real – in a safeguarded role – Ødegaard showed great confidence and willingness to let balls run across his body, and to create separations by touching the ball in the opposite direction to which he was fainting to move.
These could help overcome the ball-facing aspect, as well as the fact he would often require 2, 3 or even 4 single, left-footed touches to comfortably turn and angle the ball around his body, rather than shift his body around the ball.
Sometimes the impact of this can be almost completely inconsequential, but other times it can lead to missed opportunities or un-maximised situations.
Whilst there are still many occasions in tight pockets high and out wide where he is guilty of this, the system under Arteta has done a great job of both maximising and minimising this.
It has been minimised in the sense that he’s being put into more positions that encourage open-bodied first touches, especially since they occur in repeatable environments. So, when he receives wide in the open pocket, he can trust that he has the time and space to let the ball run across his body, onto his weaker foot.
But, equally, maximising in the sense that these additional, negative touches can be utilised to deliberately draw pressure, which can be crucial to manipulating overloads under pressure or triggering higher-paced passages that pick the lock of the opposition.
With the nature of his role being simplified, he’s also been able to repeatedly scan in a certain way that provides increased assurance. His now-instinctual and routine scans for the exact level of blind-sided pressure he’s under has benefitted his press-resistance, and has thus helped him adapt what kinds of first touches he chooses to take on.
Ball-carrying
For all the tidiness of Ødegaard’s first touches, what lacks, still, is his ability to take the ball on any further. There is little natural fluidity or spring to the way he takes on a pass, even when he takes it on the half-turn.
So much of his dribbling is about close-to-body touches, so whether he progresses the ball once he’s received through the lines depends solely upon what’s in front of him: space or teammates.
In the case of the former, the Norwegian almost seizes up. However, the level of intent and applied action for Arsenal has been of some contrast to what the #8 was attempting in his time at La Real.
No doubt enhanced by the comfort of his role, in regards to his deep position – and possibly the matter of it being a less physically intimidating league – Ødegaard was full of initiative when it came to driving runs. Even sometimes to the level at which Saka executes his weaving runs through tight gaps.
There was plenty of invention to his dribbles starting in space for La Real, sometimes using his negative touches to accelerate on the turn, but also having the daringness to target small gaps that he could carefully sew runs through.
A lot has changed under Arteta, though. His dribbles attempted per 90 have dropped from 3.35 under Alguacil to just 1.36. That driving intent is now left almost entirely to Saka, most likely because the situations in which Ødegaard could attempt to make these runs are situations where the opposition would be able to dispossess him and evade the counter-pressure with greater ease. It is important to note, after all, that even those brighter individual runs – which have been sorely lacking from him in North London – aren’t without their technical faults.
In smaller pockets, in Spain and here, Ødegaard doesn’t use his weaker, right foot to protect the ball at all. Consequently, it’s quite easy to dispossess him from typically awkward angles. He also fails to spread his body over the ball, as he is regularly tall-standing, which makes changing direction very difficult. He is also quick to close off angles due to how often he uses the outside of his boot to complete touches, which adds to his inability to move in either direction, thus making him easier to read and direct.
In larger spaces, the same approach also limits how fast Ødegaard can accelerate. He has no touch length variation, meaning that he only takes very compressed and concise left-footed touches that are incredibly difficult to sustain over larger spaces. These, too, lead to more incidentally loose touches, and are altogether easily offset by remote pressure, which highlights both how unimposing Ødegaard is physically and how glued to the ground his eyes are in both scenarios.
As a result, the very few attempts he has tried for have unsurprisingly seen him caught up to and smothered from behind before he can get his head up to release.
It should be of little surprise, then, that when small avenues do open ahead of him on the inside, he is quick to dismiss the opportunity.
With Saka right beside him, it’s by no means a huge problem. However, in combination with his inability to operate as a needle player between the lines – often tripping over the same technical obstacles – its absence does become increasingly notable on days where the system isn’t fully functioning, or in the bigger matches where it can’t and so his creative presence quickly dissipates.
Whether he could – or would even be allowed to – redevelop some of that drive in his own right remains to be seen, but that would still be far from transformative.
Passing
Making use of his “flaws”
Hindered by the above factors, Ødegaard has maintained his fair share of struggles when it comes to aspects of his passing. He is not quite the constant live-wire instigator that the likes of Saka and Smith-Rowe are. However, he did still show plenty of promise in the Basque Country as an enthusiastic instigator deep of the opposition’s midfield line, looking to then push between the lines.
His touch-and-go moves, particularly when drifting into the middle, were very positive and often cleanly-executed. It was just a matter of foresight beyond that point which was slowing him down.
For Arsenal, fewer opportunities for these fluid exchanges through the middle have presented themselves, but his compatibility with former teammate Alexander Isak was striving to be seen alongside Saka, and could yet be seen alongside future centre-forwards.
In any case, what Ødegaard does possess more so than his colleagues is a final ball, so it was pivotal that this was built around. What the system, at least partly, aimed to do was eliminate the types of actions that tended to end poorly on Ødegaard’s end. To provide the framework to build chemistry with Saka, and to put him in the best possible scenarios to be able to create and dictate.
One clear application, on top of the handful highlighted so far, has been how Ødegaard acts when receiving under pressure and/or between the lines, as the weight of decision-making is removed. Largely, all he has to do is lay it off to the awaiting free man deep of him.
Nigh on every time he receives in a pocket of space, his mind is already made up for him, so there isn’t much risk of a turnover.
This extends to many counterattacks, where the post-turnover attacking shape morphs from a tight box into a well-spread ‘W’ (2-3) shape.
This allows for easy one-touch passes as part of routine combinations that can work the ball out of pressure, whilst ensuring back to goal players aren’t caught on the ball and goal-facing players have the easiest time locating the forward options.
Even when this isn’t in place, his initial counterattacking actions are still simplified by him receiving in the same nature, with his back to goal, aiming to feed the multiple layoff options.
As I’ve already stressed, the pinned right-wing position Ødegaard receives in strikes a great balance. That of pressure, being as there is so little due to the setup, and his preference to drop deep and wide into a position where, once he cuts in, he has the entire field in his vision.
Besides centralising the playmaker at times, it kills two birds with one stone: the issue of his body angling over the ball and using this to manipulate the way the opposition shifts.
When he’s able to cut in like this, he’s not only able to keep most of the field within his eye-line, but he’s also able to turn the bodies of the opposition block. As they see his body open towards the opposite side, it leads to opponents anticipating play moving in that direction, which is what opens up small gaps for him to feed very effective reverse balls and disguised passes.
In Spain, whilst he made good use of the reverse angle, he would often lose some of that disguise factor as he would cut-in before shaping and scanning quite blatantly, which gave away his intentions. Now that the order is reversed, though, it’s very difficult to react to.
What’s more is that he’s moving across the edge of the block, so he’s rarely under significant pressure. He has the security by way of the ball being on the far-side of his body relative to his nearest opponent, the fact that there are always options short of him, and the fact he’s already perfectly angled (by his preference) to be able to release the ball at a moment’s notice
The Saka link
It’s why striking up a chemistry with a player like Saka has been so pivotal, as being on the same wavelength as another attacker can help to maximise these minor advantages through instinctual combinations that are difficult to compensate for in any case.
Of course, the partnership took a while to get going. Before the system started to tick fully in the latter half of the season – and even sometimes then – the attacking midfielder hadn’t yet built up a habit of looking towards Saka. Consequently, he would occasionally cut in and play backwards without having even noticed a viable run Saka had made, or would be too quick to head backwards when he was primed to act as the middle man in a Saka-sparked give-and-go.
In those performances before the system clicked into gear, he was also a player short on a little bit of confidence, which is essential to his outlook on games.
Combined with some elements of tunnel vision – as his scanning is instinctually geared towards opposition pressure, rather than space – he would struggle therefore with receiving and returning linkups from the pockets just inside the touchline.
As there is a greater feeling of blind-sided pressure in those situations, particularly as the ball is less guarded when it’s left to run, Ødegaard has felt naturally inclined to avoid letting it do so. Resultantly, his exploitation of space on the inside and the ways in which he is able to feed back the ball are skewed.
What developed over the proceeding months was building an understanding with Saka and learning the desired patterns of the system.
With greater trust in Saka and where he’s opting to move, Ødegaard knows when to time his actions, which brings out the best in the aforementioned use of his body angling. As seen above like in some earlier clips shown, he can so quickly go from static to full-paced, with an even better timed two-touch dynamic than previously seen that pulls the opposition’s eyes one way as the ball, and Saka, quickly sets off in another.
The confidence factor
Of course, not every match is so straightforward. Teams have increasingly looked to tighten the space Ødegaard has been able to receive in out wide by pressing him more directly as he moves there instead, which puts him in some more uncomfortable situations.
However, the growing trust in Saka ensures that he can feel comfortable playing sooner into feet, all the while knowing that playing backwards is still a viable option that can eventually lead to him exploiting that same space.
Liverpool were likely the sternest test of this resolve as the added press from Andy Robertson (from left-back) was a calculated-yet-fruitful risk. It succeeded because Ødegaard can become flustered by these high-pressure situations and doesn’t have the natural ball-carrying ability to overcome them with any ease.
In that particular 2-0 home loss following a great run of results, Ødegaard failed to stand out even in Arsenal’s more dominant phases, because he was offset by the amount of pressure he was having to deal with. This leaked into his confidence, or lack thereof, when executing actions elsewhere on the pitch. Given what he lacks in other areas of his game – both in terms of dribbling and attacking movement – the lack of a supply saw his impact on proceedings quickly fizzle out.
In contrast to this are the dazzling heights he’s able to achieve during winning game states. Even in the best of games, he can still take a little while to get going, but when Arsenal are ahead in a match, Ødegaard seems to take on a new lease of life. As though a weight had just been lifted off his shoulders. There becomes a far smoother ebb and flow to the way and frequency at which he combines, even in situations where he would otherwise stall in level game states.
He evades pressure as if he’s playing in the park and rarely second guesses his own actions, particularly the creative ones.
The disparity between the two is indeed concerning but is nonetheless a big positive when you’re leading the match and aiming to secure it, especially as his intensity and concentration scarcely lets up.
Chance creation
Although the Norwegian may be best known for his quality of final ball and his creativity, his opportunities to be the pivotal shot-assister are quite sparing when it comes to the biggest chances generated. Hence why his Expected Assists (xA) per 90 last season was at a modest 0.22.
With so much of his play stemming from the aforementioned deep right-wing space outside of the opposition’s block, his best contributions are often those that create the chance as a whole (i.e. the pass before the final pass).
The best examples of this being those examples already shown of how he threads the needle on the cut-in – using the disguise to such lethal effect.
In spite of his nonetheless impressive 2.46 shot assists per 90, he could be considered more of a ‘playmaker’ in this role than a pure shot-creator. This is partially reflected in his raw numbers for the season, as he ended with more goals (7) than assists (4), however, his underlying numbers in each (4.8 non-penalty xG vs 6.8 xA) suggest that it would still be unlikely to continue in this same manner next season.
All that being said, both his vision and efforts do boast many of their own imperfections.
Vision and preparedness
Having the awareness to see the pass ahead of time was quite consistently a problem for him in Spain, as he wasn’t always readily set to release the ball, meaning his head would still be down when the run was at its most viable.
Even if he then fed the right type of pass, his teammates were no longer on the same wavelength, and were thus unready to handle or attack the ball.
In addition to putting him in more deep positions to always be readily set, the mechanics of the system work so that he can play blindly when he receives from the left closer to the final third.
As you’ll see below, when closer to the final third, he is most often waiting in a flatter position in line with the ball-holder. When the ball reaches him here, the no.1 goal is to access Saka, as the side-to-side transition should lead to an isolated take-on.
Such is the formality of this routine that he has no problems setting the ball with his weaker foot and moving it straight on with his left. It’s another action completely simplified, where he might otherwise have struggled to effectively scan the angles necessary in time to have the confidence to successfully pull off this pass.
The particular scanning he does here mirrors that of what was highlighted earlier – checking exclusively for the extent of the blind-sided pressure, and also, briefly, the whereabouts of Saka.
How this protects his limitations but cannot fully conceal them is highlighted in moments where he fails to identify and feed the runner across from him instead.
In more specific cases where Saka changes up his run to exploit a space last minute, the same can be seen but to a more jarring affect, as Ødegaard then has to work to create the correct angle for his body.
In these left to right passages, his setting touch squaring his body over the ball puts him in a stance that he feels most uncomfortable shifting the ball forwards from. As a result, he requires more time and more touches to set himself, by which point the run is usually already accounted for.
The further inside the pitch Ødegaard is when looking for that final ball, the less prepared he is to act on split-second openings. This is due to the fact he has to square himself up more when he is centralised. So, even when he continues to move across the opposition’s perimeter, it’s not at quite the same acute angle, which results in small but damaging extra touches being taken, which cut off the right side further, and where the hesitance and added time waste opportunities.
Even when he then appears set to play in a run, he seems to then doubt whether that is the case with disguise effect lessened from here and the margin of error being smaller.
Execution and decision-making
Ødegaard has a decent knack for using the outside and laces of his boot to skim the ball in a more vertical manner, which has been best illustrated during some of his out-swinging corners. More often than not, though, he opts for the wrapped technique, using the inside of his boot.
The gentle finesse to these diagonal attempts at feeding runs make it feel as though the ball is destined to land right on a sixpence at his target’s feet, but this is infrequently the reality. The diagonals are a bit easier to read, so opponents have an easier time intercepting them when their weighted just short, which has repeatedly been the case with many of his in-swinging crosses and corners.
He’s had greater success finding his targets from deeper set-pieces, however, the lack of consistent accuracy and the shared responsibility of set-piece duties has led to a decline in its contribution to his overall creative figure.
With La Real, 43.55% (27/62) of his shot assists came from dead balls, whereas just 14.29% (11/77) of last season’s shot assists came from such situations, according to WhoScored.
Where his general weight of pass lets him down the most is in transitions. As we’ve seen, the next pass is often pre-determined, with the typical aim being to feed Saka. These passes in stretched phases of play, which demand greater precision, have consistently lacked just that in order to avoid interceptions or dragging Saka off course.
Once Ødegaard spots the open alleyway to feed the ball through during his initial pre-scan, he’s capable of showing a far superior speed of release to what he accomplishes in settled states. However, these passes are habitually made prematurely due to the fact his vision of the larger picture is more limited.
Unlike the very top-level creators/playmakers, he doesn’t possess the same composure and foresight to assess the situation for what it is. This goes beyond just identifying which is the best option out of multiple, it also applies to how you calculate the different ways in which you can feed even just a singular open teammate.
In the above examples, the urgency frequently blurs his clarity. There can be multiple ways of maximising a simple overload, with the simplest sometimes being the least effective. There are occasions that do demand multiple touches and a level of perceived selfishness that Ødegaard lacks. This is, of course, no further aided by the lacking confidence in his ball-carrying abilities.
It’s far from ideal that so many aspects of these scenarios clash with his weaknesses, particularly as these can be crucial to either killing off an already-downed opponent, or making the most of the scraps that the very top sides give you.
Off-ball threat
Lacking awareness
Even in a more mechanical setup for La Real, Ødegaard still struggled to make himself a threat in the final third. The aforementioned facets of his awareness and body angling already act as major stumbling blocks when it comes to recognising open spaces to attack, as he often has his back to them.
This past season, much of the same has been prevalent in his movement. When it comes to his improved awareness at Arsenal, the scanning revolves around players, not the space, so he still faces the same hurdles.
Even taking into account the system’s focus on safety, there were repeated situations where the lack of awareness traded up opportunities to attack open spaces without a lot of risk.
The fix
The solution to this problem, beyond often removing the need for the Norwegian to make difficult, off-the-cuff runs, is to, again, simplify the ones he does make. What’s been key to this, both in and out of transitions, is the ‘W’ (2-3) shape he has helped consistently form at the spearhead of attacks.
In general phases of possession, this would try to be manufactured by injecting pace into attacks following steady, deep-lined buildup, so that the transitional effect can still be replicated.
The cutback area is where he most often lingered for La Real – albeit usually out of reluctance to push to the face of goal – and was thus the most common way for him to get on the ends of chances. The same is the case here, except the direction of play often helps to make these moves more damaging.
With the space pinned just short of the opposition’s defensive line, and the fact he’s coming in from such a deep position – with the ball, goal and space all within his eye-line – he can invade the box in more direct ways that come far more easily to him.
Similar principles apply to applications of this in counterattacking phases of play, except with a little more positional restraint, as maintaining the deepest layer of the 5-man spread is integral to the counter-pressing element of it.
These moves can comprise of pre-emptive overlaps that aim to let the wide attackers cut-in, as it overloads their opponent and maintains the positional staggering.
Sometimes, also, holding the positions can best make use of where the biggest spaces are, which is on the cutback since the opposition are vertically stretched. Therefore, it can be more harmful to push too close to the back-line.
There are still imperfections that seep through the cracks on occasion, though, as Ødegaard can be reluctant to fulfil the task of the wide attacker that is required to push into depth.
Setting and finishing
Whilst getting into good positions is invaluable to goalscoring, being able to set up your shot – particularly for a player who often receives around the edge of the box – is still vital, and it’s something Ødegaard has, overall, struggled with.
Although his execution of the shift and shoot using that sharp touch backwards can be effectively applied at the edge of the box, it requires some time and space. This is not the case when receiving whilst running onto the ball, where he has issues confidently trapping balls into feet. Especially when receiving from the right, his view of the space and the goal are then more detached, so the lack of fluidity to touches taken in his stride make it difficult for him to naturally open up his body to the goal in a swift motion.
Resultantly, the ball then gets frequently caught underneath his body, which can lead to his next touch being far more jarring and negative as his inclination, as seen earlier, is to set the ball backwards at a tighter angle. Consequently, he then reduces the parts of the goal he’s able to aim for, making the eventual shot easier to read and to block.
Where there’s a slight conflict is in the way that Ødegaard is that he’s most often having to aim his shots to the left side of the goal. Generally, he seems to strike the ball better when shooting towards the right side as he can wrap his foot around the ball more convincingly.
When taking on his preferred shot, he uses that cutback shift of the ball well to load up the shot to generate good pace and shape.
When shooting from right to left, however, he struggles to generate as much venom, as his go-to is a more passive, putted finish, angled towards the corner.
When he meets it in the aforementioned passages, and is therefore using the momentum of his run to improve the shape of the ball, he’s capable of finishing with great delicacy from close in.
The only other notable instance where he handles this shot direction well is from direct free kicks, as his gently curled efforts are often close to the mark.
The repeatability of the above actions – especially in reference to drifting crossing movements – have helped increase his shot figures from his time at La Real. Last season’s 2.46 per 90 are up from his previous 2.14. Equally, his NPxG rate has risen by 45%, as he now amasses 0.16 compared to his previous 0.11 average. Finally, his xG per shot average has subtly risen, also, moving up from 0.07 to 0.09 – he is, after all, still very willing to use his short bursting touches on the cut-in to set his sights on snapped, driven shots from range.
As a whole, it’s, again, not too surprising that his goal tally is higher than his assist count due to the ease of movement and the types of chances it allows for. This should be a repeatable, and even slightly improvable, figure although these finishes are still unlikely to come in more improvised situations.
Defence
Pressing
When I talked about his defensive side in my initial Ødegaard analysis, I noted that his average of 18.4 pressures per 90 at a success rate of 24.2% for La Real was strikingly similar to Smith-Rowe’s figures at the time. So that aspect of his work rate would have certainly played a part when weighing up the pros of his acquisition. There is indeed a heavy demand for that kind of intensity, here, which is illustrated by the subtle increase to 18.6 pressures at a success rate of 26.8%.
Whilst this is a big positive, it can be rendered relatively useless if the technical approach isn’t there to back it up, as was the problem in Spain. Usually defending as an #8 in a 4-1-4-1 shape, Ødegaard was guilty of pressing headlessly. He would lack regard for the space and the options around him, as well as shape his body too narrowly and fail to curve his runs towards the ball-holder.
Although he is still guilty of this and has some issues when it comes to blind-sided awareness, Ødegaard has come through a bit of a transformation in the same way Smith-Rowe did.
Awareness-wise, he does a far better job of using his pre-scanning to dictate his angle of approach, the timing of it, and the decision to do so or not. As a result, he better curves his runs so not to leave the opposition’s #6 as exposed. He has also developed a fairly pivotal habit of slowing his presses down, meaning he’s not left as flat-footed by touches against the grain and subsequently has an easier time shifting directions.
The intensity and improved approach is all hugely important for a side that morphs its pressing structures quite often, even if the starting shape is always that of a 4-4-2. This means there are many matches where Ødegaard is required to fill in the roles of others or mop up free options that could be accessible via wall passes.
The only ways in which he falls short of the instructions is simply on a broader, physical level. He’s guilty of not always getting quite tight enough to the deeper option, which can allow for the sorts of wall passes that the opposition is after.
Against ball-carrying opposition from deep, if he’s not on top of the situation, he’s also quick to quit his chasing it down, as his lack of pace over greater distances means that he feels the need to go in early for the kill. As a result, he frequently misses the ball and the man altogether.
Both aspects are amplified by the absence of any kind of physical edge, as he is neither built well enough to challenge shoulder-to-shoulder, nor does he use his body smartly enough. He would stand a much better chance if he aimed to cut across his opponents, and lowered and spread his body to create a sterner, lower centre of gravity. Alas.
Beyond those points, there are still some generic cracks to his pressing that have yet to be covered fully. He is still vulnerable to those shifts against the grain because his body shape tends hold narrow up too heavily specifically during its runs, so changing mid-press is tricky.
When it comes to his scanning, he is often a one-and-done-type presser, so there are occasions where there’s enough time and space before Ødegaard reaches the centre-back for the #6 to be able to create a new angle.
Equally, when following the player he’s pressed out onto, his eyes are then quick to glue themselves to the ball, so any attempts at pass-and-moves from the centre-backs can expose Ødegaard’s habit of switching off positionally momentarily.
Nevertheless, the growing upsides of his game are often good enough to cause most teams ample trouble, especially from this slightly more advanced and guarded position Ødegaard is able to pursue the ball from.
Counter-pressing
Ødegaard’s intensity following turnovers might’ve been an even bigger magnetising factor than his willingness to press during his Spanish spell. With the added recklessness in positional approach that can be afforded in these states of play, it unleashed him to be the unrelenting thorn in the side of any ball-holder still patrolling their own half.
His willingness to hunt down play on the opposite side of the pitch, be it solo or as an added extra to truly suffocate all angles, is remarkable. In fact, it’s not just limited to the opposition’s half – he is constantly on red-alert to open runs being made towards his own box when teammates are out of position, and is more than prepared to track back into the spaces to deal with them.
This is even more impressive when you see how late into games he still commits to such intense counter-pressing. It has altogether been strengthened in its effectiveness by the structure put in place to smother every loose ball in sight.
There are still elements of poise and patience to Ødegaard, here, though, in the way he measures his position and speed of approach in certain, balanced situations that require such attention.
The overall improvements to his game, and just how involved he is in these ruthless phases of play, are likely the reason why he ranks in the 96th percentile for final third tackles per 90 – up to 0.61 having been at 0.18 with La Real. Even his success rate against dribbles has shot up from by 14.1% to 30.8%.
However, good ball-carriers are still able to best him. In those same wide duels, he might be able to shift well with them initially, but he’s quick to close up his body in an attempt to make a premature tackle. And, against those unrelenting ball-carriers is where some frustration can eke out, as Ødegaard has a habit of leaving an unnecessary leg out in amongst the enthusiasm of his approaches.
Even worse is when he’s tracking them shoulder-to-shoulder, which is something he’s also poor at in deeper phases. It’s not just the lacking physical edge, it is, as mentioned, that he mostly loses these exchanges by not assessing the space in order to cover the area in front of the ball-carrier.
These are pronounced issues in isolation but don’t nearly equate to a net negative, as Ødegaard’s enthusiasm and work ethic are vital to the team.
Defending in a block
Unlike for La Real, Ødegaard has been afforded the luxury of defending as a striker for both the capital giants and now Arsenal. This is where he has the least impact, but it remains a necessity.
The playmaker’s intensity levels are much more binary, here, with what feels like a lot of energy conservation. He tends to stick to his position just in front of the midfield double pivot just fine, but doesn’t take care to scan any part of his blind-side, so becomes a passenger in this shape.
The occasional opportunity to press across to the #6 or out to a centre-back is much more likely to be exploited because of these lapses in different parts of his approach. As a consequence of this, he’ll find himself pressing out without having noticed the wide-open deep midfielder sat just to the side, who is ready to then tear through the gap in front. Alternatively, he might find himself pressing from an angle that over-prioritises the backwards pass, rather than playing to the percentages by covering the more dangerous options/spaces deep of the ball.
Previously, for La Real, his #8 position and his tendency to leave a gap into the player on his blind-side was a frequent issue. Thankfully, here, as part of the 1st line of defence, he’s no longer held as accountable for his passive defending, even though the general shape has had its issues with compactness.
Whilst he could certainly be much more of a presence at the head of the shape, he can’t achieve that individually. In any case, he works back well towards the edge of his own third, or deeper, to help congest play and be in position to offer following turnovers.
Conclusion
Ødegaard has found himself the perfect home at Arsenal under Arteta. There are only so many environments in world football that can work to such a degree to camouflage flaws and heighten strengths. So, it’s great news for him that there is a dependency on his services.
As the team (hopefully) fills out, and each player become more and more acquainted with one another and the demands of the system, there should be plenty of room to see prolonged strong stretches of high-level performances.
Additions to the squad to improve balance, as well as the depth of profiles like Ødegaard’s, will be crucial to the team’s overall success, though. The #8’s sometimes-jarring struggles to have a say on proceedings when the system isn’t in place, or when faced against greater opposition, can be a real area for concern.
I wouldn’t be too hopeful on the topic of believing certain weak spots will inevitably come good – at least not on the attacking side – as those previously-seen glimmers of added brightness are both tougher to execute and tougher to apply within this league and environment respectively. But that doesn’t remove the fact that he’s managed to become a crucial cog in the works, and that his unique tendencies are ones that have their own place in such adding value to such a meticulous approach. Therefore, he’s proving to be a worthier long-term addition than his outright game seemed to, and still ultimately does, suggest.
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Thanks for reading.
Over on my Twitter you can find even more of this, as well as plenty of my scouting work on other individuals. And, just as a minute plea of sorts: if you enjoy any of my work and want to help out in any way, I have my CashApp linked to my profile, and I’m also available for hire (DMs open/email on my page, too). I tend to avoid pushing this sort of stuff, but since I put so many hours into my pay-free work, I feel it’s worth publicising that.
Great read, Peter!