How Arsenal's defensive disorganisation helped provide United with a steady route to victory
Man United 3-2 Arsenal Analysis
Thursday night’s trip to Old Trafford ended in a rather chaotic defeat for Arteta’s side. Yet, much of the match’s chaos felt as though it was heavily influenced by the mess left by Arsenal.
Whilst the attacking side of things, as I touched on in my last piece, was still very hot and cold in moments where it was forced to take the spotlight, the defensive side of things was brought more to light here.
With that in mind, here’s a look at how defensive inconsistencies – from top to bottom – were gradually exploited during United’s win on the comeback trail.
The Press
Arteta went toe-for-toe in some respects with his setup – fielding a quite typical 4-4-2 out of possession, which, on paper, mirrored Carrick’s United setup.
The early intent was to suffocate United in their deepest buildup phases, which was a logical move given the issues that the Manchester side have had for a while now. It’s something that was further echoed by the audible angst heard from the crowd when the home side’s buildup play wasn’t moving at the desired pace.
With a stagnant buildup phase that bore opportunities to potentially exploit the hosts via high and intense pressure, Arteta had appeared to set out his side to shift from a 4-4-2 into a 4-4-1-1, with Ødegaard and Aubameyang splitting as the two strikers to be able to direct play and cut off the far side.
In the short, early example above, Aubameyang’s curved press out to the ball-holding centre-back creates a vertical split between him and Ødegaard. The latter complies by tightening the space between the striker and the midfield, as well as the space United have to operate in down that side.
This seemed like a good way to limit the ease of passage for United and could possibly apply the right amount of pressure to the opposition’s restrict-able double pivot. Unfortunately, the execution of the plan left much to be desired with each passing attempt.
1st passage
The first pass out is the trigger for Aubameyang to step up to the ball-holder. However, he chooses to curve his press out-to-in rather than in-to-out. This makes life easy for Lindelöf because he can play the way he’s facing, and it displaces Aubameyang from the structure.
Had he moved initially from in-to-out (as the faint arrow annotation implies), Lindelöf would’ve had to take extra touches to adjust and release the ball into a restricted area of the pitch.
In support of that would be Ødegaard marking the near-sided #6 (McTominay), who, even if accessed immediately, could be easily pressured by the Norwegian by the time the ball reached him, thus backing play further into that side.
Possibly the obvious counterpoint is a heavy focus on directing play to United’s left side, but not only is it an unnecessary emphasis given the weaknesses down both sides, but it’s also not informed by the way Ødegaard proceeds to act, who appeared to be left with a bit of a conundrum for Ødegaard to decipher.
With two outside opponents he couldn’t sacrifice fully, he was already calling for the aid of a deep midfielder that was miles away from the player he was having to neglect.
With Aubameyang caught in no-man’s land between the three recycling the ball, McTominay had the easy option of a wall pass, or even to turn and face goal-wards given the distance between him and the oncoming presser.
Once he’d used the time and space he had to turn and face, this switched the approach of the defence completely. Smith-Rowe, on the left, then had to change gears from being in a position to quickly press out onto the likely receiver (Dalot), to narrowing in for the sake of horizontal compactness so that the off-screen attacker between the lines couldn’t be accessed.
The time and space Dalot had, and the committed approach to following opponents man-for-man across the defensive line resulted in a chance for him to play down the line into Rashford’s 1v1 ball chase against Tavares.
Although the 1v1 defending at the back did enough to (temporarily) cut out the main danger inflicted by the disorganisation of the press, it would not always come down to this for the visitors.
2nd passage
Besides the change of game state here, the other slight difference to the beginning of this example is that it’s Ødegaard pressing out since he’s the nearest challenger. Here, also, the body shape of Maguire makes it easy for the curved, in-to-out press to direct play to the flank again.
The main issue here, unlike in the 1st example, is wholesale commitment, or a lack thereof.
Aubameyang fails to comply with the vertical rotation in the split, and by doing so leaves Fred free. This, again, forces the holding midfielder on the near side to have to step out almost uncomfortably far in order to balance his position between two opponents.
Whilst the ground Aubameyang ideally has to make up is quite a lot, it’s not a situation where he needs to be touch-tight. A closer balancing position just over the shoulder of Fred would force hesitation in playing the ball to him, not least because of his individual flaws, and would also cast a cover shadow over the far-sided centre-back.
By ensuring the lane into Fred can be pressured and the lane into Lindelöf can be covered positionally, which is in addition to McTominay as the one other midfield option still occupying the same lane as Fred relative to the ball-holder. It could therefore force those forced into playing the ball across to do so aerially to keep it safe, which would afford the Arsenal press ample time to shift across and reset at the very least.
There is the valid point that this transition in shape up front isn’t the only way to limit United – a flat two can be effective in blocking out the opposition’s double pivot. However, the difference here is the contradiction in the approach of both strikers.
After a while, Ronaldo was the choice receiver down the line into feet because, with his stronger foot being his right, he could step back onto the ball and play inside comfortably. In this case, having had the spare attackers strategically push ahead to draw open the deep midfield space, there was then the space for the layoff into Fred.
The contradiction is that Ødegaard’s position is still based off of his curve press onto Maguire. If the intention was to be zonal away from trigger pressing, he would likely have already made an effort to get back goal-side by now, so that the backwards option would be Maguire instead of Fred.
However, the pressing approach on the near-side, which was let down by Aubameyang’s positioning, meant that United could soak up the pressure, relieve it by shifting play across.
At this moment, it could also be argued that it did no harm since Arsenal were able to reset, and because United’s structure midfield personnel struggle to facilitate quick, direct transitions.
Yet, it gradually forced Arteta’s side deeper than before. Bit by bit. It also was not where the progress ended for the home side.
The same issue as earlier is pictured above, with Aubameyang, here, reacting to McTominay’s on-ball actions from a relatively square-on position. By waiting for the opponent’s action, Aubameyang misses the chance to instigate a curved press that otherwise would shuttle play out to the flank quite comfortably.
Consequently, the Scot can play back to the middle and spark a lengthier curve press from Aubameyang, as the 1-1 split is seen below.
But, unlike in the very first example of this piece where Aubameyang pursued the ball relentlessly using his cover shadow, the intensity of the pressing is shared now.
Ødegaard takes over the reigns, but once again without the necessary rotation from Aubameyang to supplement this. The below screenshot therefore paints an already familiar picture.
The same routine is carried out, even more easily this time as the side-to-side circulation results in a drop-off across the shape meaning that Martinelli isn’t nearly as aggressive against Telles as he was able to be in the 1st passage shown.
Even if the intensity has dropped off collectively to the point where Aubameyang coming close could open the far side up too much for Ronaldo on the cut-in, the natural adjustment would’ve been for Ødegaard to drop in line so not to be caught on Fred’s heels again.
Having pulled off the same trick twice, McTominay now has the ball with plenty of time and space much further up the pitch – he uses the opportunity, then, to target Ronaldo’s aerial threat against Ben White’s quite renowned aerial weakness. From there, United are able to establish final third possession.
Arteta’s team taking their foot off the gas after going ahead before relying on their defensive block is not news to any Arsenal fan.
Although I don’t have the exact data to back it up, the apparent drop in intensity post-Smith-Rowe’s opening goal was one that clashed horribly with the continuation of the defensive instructions used in higher defensive phases. Even before that, the most intensely committed versions of the press had already shown fault lines.
However, this was just one of a few ways United eased their way up the pitch. Other ways included their aerial dominance – they won 60% of the aerial duels. Often, these were instigated as a result of Arsenal’s own failed and frantic passing routines out of the back, which resulted in long balls up the pitch that were inconsistently met with viable 2nd ball structures. Whether or not the header fell their way, or whether the ensuing combination worked beyond the first pass, was another matter.
Defending as a block
Arsenal continued to be the architects of their own downfall deep into their own half. The extent to which Arteta aimed to avoid having Ronaldo dominate the back post area via crosses acted as a double-edged sword. Whilst the Portuguese striker didn’t get a headed shot off in the match, the damage caused by the disruption to the shape was what enabled him to bag a brace anyway.
As I highlighted during the match yesterday, it didn’t take much for Partey and/or White to neglect their ball-sided duties in favour of crowding Ronaldo’s space.
In some ways similar to the way a mistaken approach forced Smith-Rowe to change from man-marking to zonal marking in the 1st passage, the opposite was true here because of the impact that, more often than not, White’s neglect of United’s left halfspace caused.
1st passage
Despite Aubameyang having just needlessly burnt himself out by running in circles, the general starting block was solid and showed signs of promise in forcing United to play around Arsenal.
However, things quickly become disorganised when White’s subtle shift inwards before a cross could even be teased left a widened gap between him and Tomiyasu.
Telles – and later Fred – were key exponents to the exploitation of this throughout.
After doing the honest tracking, Martinelli is forced to cement his position inside the defensive line because of how exposed the defence would be if he stepped back out. This then results in Ødegaard dropping in. With Aubameyang not keeping tight to the shape, also, it suddenly becomes a very flat 5-4-0-1.
As a consequence of the strikers’ positions, Arsenal were consistently without any kind of out-ball. The numbers surrendered to the back-post made it easy for United to mark up players instantly following turnovers, and it wasn’t hard to pressure some of the more rigid ball-handlers in tight areas, like Elneny and Tomiyasu.
The flatness in front of the block meant United could avoid playing in U shapes that might have afforded Arsenal time to shift from side-to-side effectively.
A simple square exchange in that exact space was all it took for Ødegaard to be drawn out in a position that he had every right to re-assume. However, Martinelli, because of White’s doubling up on Ronaldo, could not recover to his right-wing slot.
What’s worse is that this completely opened the space for the perfect United crossing opportunity, meanwhile White wasn’t actually aiding Gabriel in preparation for a potential in-swinger.
United – or, rather, Bruno – to his or their credit, then avoided the low percentage plays and aimed to exploit what Arsenal had given them the opportunity to capitalise on.
The reverse through ball for Dalot’s underlap to the byline perfectly utlised the one-dimensionality of Arsenal’s halfspace coverage without White there. The fact that they were much more ball-drawn on the near side than the defenders on the far-side meant that there was often an onside gap left in their streak.
2nd passage
Although the above example didn’t prove costly, the exposure to this pattern of play did before the half was out.
Ironically, this move began with Partey dropping back early to fill the channels that Ronaldo would usually threaten. However, here, Ronaldo was the one exploiting the exposed midfield gap with his short pass into Sancho.
It might not seem like much, but having the roam of the park – being able to feed the ball in and out of central areas like this, can help build rhythm. It also, in Arsenal’s case, avoids what might’ve been an opportunity for a pressure-able, stagnant recirculation of the ball that could’ve drawn further moans from the home crowd.
The previously seen 4-4-2 block was at least evident in the aftermath of this.
Similar to the 1st passage, the vertical compactness and spacing is more than optimal. Ødegaard, here, does the right thing of pressing in from behind on Maguire’s run to suffocate the space and force play back out of the block.
Following a hopeful cross from deep and White’s subsequent, weak clearance of the ball, United, rather more fortuitously this time, gained entry into the final third. The fundamental issues remained the same, though.
With White shuffling back towards the penalty spot, Partey and Elneny are the covers for the halfspace, albeit the former is having to keep an eye on the overload against Tomiyasu.
The lack of communication as each member of the team continues to seemingly act by their own accord is apparent when Fred exploits the vacant blindspot with a telegraphed run from deep.
To make matters worse, White is yet again seen some distance away from Ronaldo and, in this case, was guilty of fixating on the ball which saw him lose track of Bruno’s peeled movement into a cutback position for the equaliser.
These flaws continued to show for United’s other two goals, also.
In the quick transition for Ronaldo’s first goal – where both centre-backs were so nervous of letting Ronaldo become free that they resorted to staying put – Ronaldo ended up free on the cutback.
This instance spoke more to the lack of a clear line of visible communication between the central pairing, as White is already in a position to get tighter to Ronaldo and Gabriel is in a position where he can and must close the space that Rashford had out wide.
This was later followed by the penalty that ultimately clinched the points, where Arsenal’s recovery shape left the same halfspace gap wide open for Fred to make a run into. With not even Partey across to cover, the reckless challenge from behind by Ødegaard wasn’t the biggest surprise.
Conclusion
Albeit a very different environment to that of the Newcastle win, there were sweeping similarities in the lack of a connection between many sets of individuals across the board.
Having been praised so heavily for the results he garnered via his well-drilled defensive blocks in his first season, the current state of the defensive blocks under Arteta now are a major cause for concern.
On the same note, the chemistry and communication issues expressed in the prior match were still showing through in the attacking routines here. In deep buildup phases, there were some occasionally positive movements that showed unpredictability, but it felt as though they were just as unpredictable to the teammates themselves.
It’s not the first time this season that a pressing plan has been upset by minor tactical adjustments by the opposition, either (e.g. Palace’s switch to a back-three nullifying the man-to-man press that had hurt them in the first half). It’s also not the first time that, as alluded to, Arsenal avoided trying to take a firm initiative of the match when it was there for them to.
The level of control that is missing in these important game states, particularly against sterner opposition, sees Arteta’s side walk a sometimes near-inescapable tightrope. Such immediate extremes in games appear to be an enemy of progress for a side that is aiming to climb the league and be a more dominant force and competitive with the big boys.